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Something new under the sun – The role of new 




Abstract: This paper inquires into radical innovations and into their role to promote economic growth. Can an 
economic  system  grow  only  in quantitative  terms,  or  the  process  of  structural  change,  that  underlines  the 
emergence of new technologies, is an essential ingredient? To put it philosophically: is there something new under 
the sun of a growing economy or not? The paper attempts to deal with this quest both in terms of analysis and in 
terms  of  evidence.  In  terms  of  analysis,  it  conceptualizes  the  taxonomy  of  innovation,  proposed  by  Chris 
Freeman (1994), in an input output framework. It shows how the rate of growth will eventually peter out without 
the essential contribution of new sectors in the economy. In terms of evidence, it brings the case of electronics to 
study the impact of a new technology in changing the economic structure and the knowledge structure of the UK 
and US economy between the 1970s and 1990s. The changes are profound, and they may help to start explaining 
a sort of reverse of Solow’s paradox. Namely, computer are everywhere, now also in the statistics of the tertiary 
sector.  
JEL Classification: O33, O41, O47. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economics nowadays is increasingly treated as a physical science, which little or no connections to 
philosophical  questions.  A  recent  biography  on  Keynes  reports  an  opposite  view.  Keynes  thought 
economics not as a physical science, and neither simply as a social science. He thought it as a moral 
science (Newbury 2007). The question that I am addressing in this paper may offer some support to this 
latter interpretation: Is there something new under the sun of an economic system or not? 
The quest is not itself new. It resembles the old biblical statement: "What has been is what will be [...] 
and there is nothing new under the sun" of the Ecclesiastes (Bible, Old Testament, 1998). Although this 
part of the bible (known as the Qohelet in Hebrew) seems to be written around the 250 B.C., the essence 
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of what it states is even older than that. Classic Greek philosophers of pre Socratic time were in fact the 
first to put under scrutiny the role of novelties in nature and in society. In fact, they discussed and 
offered to us two very opposite answers. In the Dialogues, Plato (2005) reports the famous dispute 
between Parmenides and Heraclitus.  
The former, Parmenides (c500bC), argued that Nature never changes. It is fixed and repeats itself. If to 
us something appears as new, this is just an illusion due to the fact that substance and appearance may 
not  be  one  and  the  same  thing.  The  consequences  of  this  interpretation  for  different  branches  of 
knowledge (not only philosophy) are indeed dramatic (Curd 1998). Parmenides is, in many respects, 
considered the grandfather of modern philosophy, and it should not come as a surprise the fact that his 
interpretation of the world has pervaded most branches of moral sciences – economics included.  
The latter, Heraclitus (c500bC), argued that Nature is change. And without change there would be no 
nature,  as  we  know  it.  Everything  evolves,  and  human  beings  are  not  an  exception.  Contrary  to 
Parmenides, he concluded that change is real and stability just an illusion. The Panta Rei aphorism well 
summarizes the point (Plato, Cratylus, ([402bC], 1926)): "Everything flows and nothing stands still", or 
as Aristotle later reported Heraclitus said: “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the 
same river and he’s not the same man. Everything flows and nothing abides. [...] If we do not expect the 
unexpected, we will never find it.” Change is universal, which it does not mean that the world is chaotic. 
There is an underlying order or reason behind change too – the Logos in the Greek philosophy. Also 
Heraclitus had an impact on modern thought. An evolutionary approach to reality resembles, explicitly 
or  implicitly,  a  world  sympathetic  to  Heraclitus,  since  “the  explanation  to  why  something  exists 
intimately  rests  on  how  it  became  what it  is”  (Dosi  1997:  1531).  Karl  Popper  (2002)  criticized  the 
Heraclitus interpretation for offering support to historicism, which is seen suspiciously nowadays among 
natural sciences, including – for those who acknowledge the linkage – economics.  
Despite the Popperian suspicion, in the following pages I will take up a Heraclitus stand. The paper will 
argue that the modern economic growth (in the sense of Kuznets 1966) is made up by economic systems 
that  do  not  change  simply  in  scale,  that  is  in  their  overall  quantitative  dimension.  They  change  in 
substance,  that  is in  their  intrinsic  structure.  In a  sentence,  to  understand  the  dramatic  quantitative 
changes of the industrial world, one cannot dismiss its qualitative transformations, provoked by new 
goods, and by new knowledge necessary to produce new goods.  
To stress this point the paper is organized in three main parts. First, it offers a workable taxonomic grid 
to  interpret  and  measure  the  qualitative  productive  changes  of  an  economic  system.  The  term 
“workable” is referred to the attempt to bring the taxonomy within an input output representation of the 
economic  system,  where  structural  changes,  and  an  expansion  of  sectors  are  explicitly  considered. 
Second, by dissecting the immediate forces that affect the movements of per capita income, it inquiries 
logically whether or not a long run process of economic growth is possible, without phenomena of 
structural change, and without the emergence of new sectors in the economy. Third, the paper inquires   3 
finally the empirical relevance of the taxonomy proposed and the logical interpretation of an expansion 
of the economic system for the case of the electronic sector.  
Some broader, and more philosophically inclined, considerations will be put forward at the end of the 
paper.  
 
2.  Structural change and economic growth 
The phenomenon of economic growth is an ideal terrain, in economics, to confront and contrast the two 
philosophical  interpretations  just  presented.  Does  a  growing  economy  change  only  exteriorly,  in 
quantitative  terms,  or  does  it  change  also  in  its  substance,  i.e.  qualitatively?  The  Parmenides 
interpretation would accept a kind of growth that repeats itself, without changing the underlying relations 
of  the  economy.  The  different  parts  of  an  economy  may  grow  in  scale,  but  without  affecting  the 
structure that keeps them together. This is what for a long time has been the essence of the multisectoral 
theories of economic growth. Such theories deal with proportional dynamics. The term "proportional" 
means that each single part of the economic system moves precisely at the same rate of change of the 
other parts, so that the economy expands or shrinks at once, while leaving the relationship between its 
parts untouched. The dimensions of the economy are allowed to change, not its underline structure.  
A typical theoretical example of this kind is represented by the von Neumann model (1945) of economic 
growth. The model shows a perfect mapping between sectoral positions and aggregate outcomes. Once 
the equilibrium exists at the initial state, it will persist in each further state. If the relative outputs are 
turned into a vector, the von Neumann model describes a multisectoral economy as it would be “one 
commodity world”. Accepting a representation of reality of this kind, in which there is no point to look 
in the internal structural movements, appears a powerful excuse for sticking with the aggregate models of 
economic growth, which in fact still dominate economics.  
A Heraclitus interpretation of modern economic growth would not accept a world  (and a theory) like 
this. It would assert that an economy grows because economic reality re invents itself, so as to make the 
vector of commodities in continuous (and sometime spasmodic) transformation. Economic variables 
(income,  employment,  inputs  and  outputs)  do  not  simply  alter  their  size,  they  alter  also  their 
composition, i.e. their relative weights and structure. New economic sectors may emerge and old sectors 
may disappear, be displaced or transformed. This implies the presence of qualitative changes within the 
economic system. Such qualitative changes are not accidental or marginal. They are “like the beat of the 
heart”, to paraphrase Schumpeter (1939: v) of a modern economic system. As one cannot step twice in 
the same river, in a growing economy too one cannot step twice into the same economic structure.  
One could argue that a Heraclitus interpretation of this kind seems akin more to the field of economic 
development, than to the field of economic growth. In fact, economic development has been defined as 
economic growth (i.e. quantitative changes) cum  structural changes (i.e.  qualitative changes). Despite its   4 
relevance,  it  is  a  discipline  usually  confined  to  the  study  of  the  less  developed  economies.1  The 
underlined argument is that the less developed economies, in order to growth, require a much deeper 
degree of change – not just the growth of production, but also a profound transformation of technology, 
institutions, preferences, and even values. In the attempt to keep up with all these elements, the theories 
of economic development adopt a less technical language than the theories of economic growth. This is 
not a pitfall in itself, but in practice economic development is not usually seen at the heart of high 
theory.2 Yet, in our context,  are the theories of economic development which seem better equipped in 
explaining a Heraclitus world.  
This does not mean that all great economists have dismissed or overlooked the subject. For instance, 
Karl Marx among the Classical economists of the XIX century and Joseph Schumpeter3 among the 
economists  of  the  XX  century  considered  structural  changes  absolutely  essential  in  explaining  the 
process of economic growth. For them, the dynamism of capitalism cannot occur without a profound 
process of transformation. Not surprisingly, they are considered among the founders of the theory of 
economic development. 
Schumpeter, Mark I (the young Schumpeter), is more explicit in this sense. In one of his first works 
(Schumpeter [1912], 1983), he made a clear distinction between an economy that repeats itself, despite 
the fact it may grow, and an economy that qualitatively changes overtime. He calls the first phenomenon 
circular flow (Ch. I), and deserves only to the second “fundamental phenomenon” (Ch. II), the label of 
economic development. The crucial difference between the two phenomena is played by innovation: i.e. 
the implementation of some new knowledge in production or distribution of goods. When an innovation 
is introduced in an economic system it will change its structure, and by changing its structure it will break 
the existent circular flow.  The economy enters in a process of “creative destruction” as later Schumpeter 
(1950) called it. At the end of such a process, the economy is in a new state almost unrecognizable from 
its previous one.  
Nowadays there is a growing amount of models that call themselves “Schumpeterian”, acknowledging 
that innovation is one of the most important engines of growth. In many of these new models, though, it 
persists the idea that innovations just bring “more” rather than they bring “different”. The impression is 
that  formal  Schumpeterian  models  still  stress  aggregate  outcomes  and  causes  of  wealth,  more  than 
dynamic  structure  and  nature  of  wealth.  Aghion  and  Howitt  (1998)  in  their  advanced  textbook  on 
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endogenous  growth  theories,  for  instance,  deserve  just  few  pages  to  the  phenomenon  of  structural 
change caused by new goods.  
In what follows I shall try  to  reverse these weights, by paying a greater attention  to  the economic 
consequences of new goods, new sectors and new economic structures. Conversely, I shall pay less 
attention  to  the  quantitative  growth,  that  innovations  may  produce,  though  I  shall  not  dismiss  the 
argument completely (see Section 6 and 8). The point I shall try to make is that a quantitative economic 
growth cannot exist without a qualitative underlined phenomenon of structural change.  
The argument will be developed with a bias towards empirics rather than pure theory. Formal models on 
structural change and economic dynamics or industrial dynamics though still marginal in mainstream 
economics, are well discussed in alternative paradigms. I refer, just to cite the classical references, the 
works of Pasinetti (1981) and (1993) and of the evolutionary economists Nelson and Winter (1982), and 
Dosi et al. (1988). 
3.  An insight into technology: Freeman’s taxonomy of innovation 
According to The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1994), an innovation is “the act of introducing something 
new”.  Schumpeter  ([1912],  1983)  called  this  “something”  an  invention,  i.e.  an  object,  process,  or 
technique which is novel.  
By accepting these standard definitions, and by observing the number of innovations around us, no one 
could probably dispute that in a modern economic system there is “something new under the sun”. What 
may be discussed, however, is the extent of consequences it may or may not procure to the essence of an 
economic system. The world (in our case, the economic world) may well run, after each innovation, 
exactly in the same way as it run before it. A conception of this kind should be sufficient to overlook the 
Heraclitus interpretation, and stick with the Parmenides one, by simply focusing on the epiphenomenon 
that each innovation hopefully procures: an aggregate growth of income. 
To put it differently, a Parmenides interpretation of the world is not incompatible with the presence of 
innovations, as long as the latter leaves substantially untouched the structure of the economy, i.e. as long 
as they do not introduce fundamental  qualitative changes.  
The idea that not all innovations had the power of changing the foundations of an economic system is 
nothing less than common sense in fact. So, to test whether a Heraclitus interpretation is acceptable or 
not one needs to ask a further question. Namely, are (at least some) innovations able to induce these 
qualitative changes? Or to put it sharply, do technological revolutions exist? This is still nowadays a 
much  debated  question.4  It  was  again  Schumpeter  (1939)  who  forcefully  highlighted  that  not  all 
innovations were the same:   just few of them were able to generate a new economic era – a new 
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Kondratieff wave.  He made a distinction between small innovations and radical innovations. The first 
were improvements of the existing economic world, while the second were novel additions to the economic 
world, that could not be obtain by a simple re organization of the existent. “"Add successively as many 
mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby" (Schumpeter [1912], 1983, p. 64).5 He 
considered these radical innovations as the first mover of the long run process of development.  
Chris Freeman, a great estimator of Schumpeter, moved forward this initial distinction and proposed a 
more  elaborate  taxonomy  of  innovations.  The  attempt  was  to  conceptualize  the  different  types  of 
technological change, according to the impact they were able to exert on the economic system.  
Based on empirical work (Freeman 1984, 1987, 1988, 1994), he distinguished  between 1) Incremental 
innovations, 2) Radical innovations; 3) New technology systems; 4) Technological revolutions or ‘New 
techno economic paradigms’. Table  1 refers to the set of definitions that he proposed. 
 
Table 1  TAXONOMY OF INNOVATIONS 
1 Incremental 
Innovations 
Gradual improvement of existing array of products, processes, organisations 
and systems of production, distribution and communication. 
2 Radical Innovations  A  discontinuity  in  products,  processes,  organisations  and  systems  of 
production,  distribution  and  communication,  i.e.  a  departure  from 
incremental  improvement,  involving  a  new  factory,  new  market  or  new 
organisation 
3 New Technology 
Systems  




A  pervasive  combination  of  system  innovations  affecting  the  entire 
economy  and  the  typical  ‘common sense’  for  designers  and  managers  in 
most or all industries. 
Source:    Freeman  C.  (1994),  “Technological  Revolutions  and  Catching Up:  ICT  and  the  NICs”  in 
Fagerberg et al.  (ed.), The Dynamics of Technology, Trade and Growth,  Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
 
To make this taxonomy somewhat more workable, we could attempt to implement its significance in a 
multisectoral  economy,  as  represented  by  an  input output  matrix,  in  which  economic  sectors  are 
organized in rows and columns. In a typical Leontievian interpretation (Leontief [1951] 1986), each 
column is a process of  production that represents an economic sector. Each sector is supposed to 
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produce  a  homogenous  economic  good.6  Each  economic  good  can  be  either  capital  good,  or 
consumption  good,  or  both.  The  rows  of  the  input output  table  indicate  how  economic  goods  are 
utilized by the system. Each good will be an input for one or more sectors of the economy  (corn is used, 
for instance, as input in the food industry), including its own sector (corn is used as seed). When an 
economic good is used completely as an “input” in the final sector, it is called consumption good. When 
it is used completely in the inter industrial sectors is called capital good. There are goods that belong to 
both categories.  
Usually the input output matrix is expressed in unitary terms, i.e. in technical coefficients: the quantity of 
inputs necessary to produce one unit of output.  
The traditional Leontief input output matrix has two key characteristics about technology: 
a)  the number of sectors are given; 
b)  the technical coefficients are fixed.  
Both characteristics have been assumed to make the input output matrix mathematically tractable. The 
first characteristic assures that the dimension of the matrix does not change, allowing therefore to make 
two or more matrixes commensurable, i.e. one comparable to the other. The second characteristic allows 
to say something about the properties of the matrix (of the economic system, in fact), without worrying 
that the coefficients that have produced, in first instance,  such properties have not meanwhile changed. 
A matrix of this kind seems suitable to describe at best a static world. But it is not so. It has been used to 
describe also a growing economy. While coefficients and the size of matrix may be constant, there is no 
requirement that total quantities are so. The matrix in other words is compatible with  a Parmenides kind 
of growth.  
Henceforth, I shall call a Parmenides input output matrix of the economic system, a matrix that holds 
characteristics: 
a) and b) as defined above, but possibly also characteristic c), namely: 
c) the technical coefficients of the matrix are allow to change, if they all change by the same degree.7  
Can anyone of Freeman’s innovations be present in a Parmenides matrix? The answer is negative. The 
technology is fixed, or is changing in a complete proportional (and unrealistic) fashion, with no new 
goods (point a), and no uneven technological improvements  (point b and point c). Hence, there is no 
room for any kind of localized sectoral innovation, small or large as it may be. An interesting point is to 
ask therefore, how Freeman taxonomy may change the Parmenides input output matrix.  
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With the help of Figure 1, I shall try to answer precisely this question.  
 
[around here Figure 1] 
 
1. Incremental innovations mainly have the effect of reducing the existent technical coefficients, which 
means  an  increase  in  productivity  levels.  The  size  of  the  table  (i.e.  the  number  of  sectors  and 
technologies in the economy) is left unchanged. Its effects are not flashy in the short term and do not 
cause profound structural changes, but as time goes by, they are essential to increase economic efficiency 
and hence to promote economic growth. Learning by doing, learning by using, and interactions between 
users  and  producers,  are  the  main  forces  behind  these  improvements.  The  typical  characteristic  of 
cumulativeness of such improvements generates increasing returns. A consistent number of studies have 
shown how they constitute an important, if not essential, source of competitiveness at sectoral as well as 
at country level (Hollander 1965, Townsend 1976, Rosenberg 1988).  
2. Radical innovations are represented (figure 1, point b) by a new column and a new row, which means 
a new sector or productive branch  of the economy. It is a situation that occurs when a new good is 
produced, which was not produced before. Its key feature is discontinuity. At the beginning the new 
good that embodies the radical innovation is still completely dependent on the old technologies, which 
are in use in the economic system, both in terms of productive inputs and organisation. Not surprisingly 
at this stage, the rest of the matrix seems unaffected by the new presence. For this reason the new 
column is full of inputs received from the rest of the matrix, while the new row of the infant sector is 
practically empty. Examples of radical innovations are not so numerous as in the case of incremental 
innovations, but in the modern world they can be singled out in the case, for instance, of  drugs, lamps, 
televisions, mp3 players, etc..   
3. A new cluster, or new technology system (figure 1, point c) is represented at aggregate level by a table 
of the same size as stage 2, but with the new sector (risen from the previous point) which begins to 
spread its influence, both directly and indirectly in other selected parts of the matrix. The influence 
occurs by giving to some other sectors, those involved in the “new cluster”, some own inputs. The 
majority of the table is still unchanged, but focusing our attention on particular industries, differences 
clearly emerge. A new constellation of sectors is established and further levels of specialisation with new 
lines of business appear.  Examples are synthetic materials, petrol chemical innovations, nuclear energy, 
machinery innovations in injection moulding and extrusion, and innumerable applications introduced 
between the 1920s, and the 1950s (Freeman, Clark and Soete 1982). 
4. A technological revolution (figure 1, point d) is a complete change of the matrix, both because one or 
more sectors have emerged (from the initial radical innovation) and because the rest of the “traditional” 
sectors  have  started  to  be  affected  (mostly) directly  by  the  new  sector(s).  A  new  cluster  is  a  natural 
candidate to become a technological revolution, though not all new clusters had the sufficient “energy”   9 
to achieve that stage.8 Only those technological clusters that become as pervasive as to be able to give 
inputs to the majority of other productive branches, or industries, will achieve the status of technological 
revolutions. The new technical coefficients, which have emerged in the new row (of the new sector, or of 
the new cluster of sectors), appear highly pervasive. They affect the composition of other inputs too in 
the various productive sectors. This is why the majority of technical coefficients are changing throughout 
the matrix, provoking transformation of technological, and organisational type. Both the real system as 
well as the price system  – Sraffa’s system (1960) – are affected. Inputs, that previously were considered 
uncompetitive, could become competitive and vice versa, outputs that could have been expensive could 
become cheap. The changes of the quantity system and the price system tend to reinforce each other: 
relative prices may change because the underlined technologies have changed, and changes of relative 
prices may push further changes of techniques.  The label ‘revolution’ is crucially connected, then, with 
the  economic  consequences  on  the  structure  of  the  economy,  more  than  with  the  essence  of  the 
technology itself.9 
Admittedly, this taxonomy (and our representation of it) does not serve the primary purpose of detecting 
the degree of novelty of a new good or a new process of production. It serves instead the purpose of 
offering a way to detect the disruption (and hence the relevance) provoked by an innovation on the 
fabric  of  an  economic  system.  Obviously,  there  is  no  a  perfect  coincidence  between  technological 
novelty and economic novelty. History counts many cases of truly revolutionary innovations, that did not 
survived in the market place, or that did not make, from an economic point of view, any significant 
impact.  This  means  that  we  are  to  a  certain  extent  conservative  too,  and  economically  bias,  in 
highlighting the novelties “under the sun”.  
With this limitation in mind, we shall call  a Heraclitus input output matrix that kind of matrix which 
allow for: 
a)   radical innovations and the emergence of new sectors, 
b)  uneven changes of technological coefficients of the matrix.  
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4.  The dynamics towards a technological revolution 
Technological revolutions are very rare, while innovations are abundant, at least in the Western world. 
Simple logic tells us that not all innovations become technological revolutions. What are the typical 
features  if any  that transform an innovation into a revolution? Analysing the previous taxonomy within 
an input output framework, one perceives that there are two key attributes: 
  the presence of a radical innovation at some point, and  
  the interconnections that the radical innovation is able to make over time, both with the other sectors 
of the economy and with the new ones that the radical innovation is able to generate itself. 
Following the representation of figure 2, one can envisage some stylized steps. 
 
[around here Figure 2] 
 
1.  When  a  radical  innovation  emerges  from  an  invention,  it  potentially  creates  a  fertile ground  for 
incremental innovations. The radical innovation, in order to foster some incremental innovations, does 
not need to be economically very important right away. But it requires to be a ‘hopeful monster’ as Mayr 
(1988: 465) has put it – i.e. a new conceptual departure that is technologically feasible. Like every infant, 
the new production line usually receives more than what it is able to offer. Its column is full of inputs, its 
row is almost empty.  For this reason we shall find that a radical innovation incubates for a long time in 
one of the existing sectors – the parental sector. If what it does is competitive, or becomes so, a process 
of diffusion initiates. The persistently higher rate of growth of its output prepares for independence. 
Statistically, at first, it continues to be recorded jointly with other sectors (see later the electronics case 
study), but eventually it would be recorded as a completely independent sector. This means that every 
time  we  use  statistics  to  highlight  (and  measure)  novelties  there  is  a  time  lag  penalty  between  the 
evolution (and disruption) of reality and the data available to represent it. 
2. When a new sector emerge, the question to ask is what kind of sector? The answer is dependent, most 
of  the  time,  on  the  kind  of  radical  innovation  we  are  facing.  Some  new  technologies  embody  the 
characteristic of satisfying directly the needs of consumers. In this case the new sector will satisfy the 
final demand and the size of the new sector will mirror the size of the final demand for the new good. As 
long  as  it  meets  consumer  preferences,  this  new  consumer  good  can  expand  and  become  even  an 
important share of the economy. It will never become, though, a technological revolution, since the rest 
of the input output matrix will remain (technologically) unaffected: the row of the new sector will be 
almost empty –and largely it will remain so. The rest of the technological coefficients remain unchanged. 
Examples  abound.  The  innovation  of  the  oral  contraceptive  device  had  a  major  impact  on  sexual 
behaviour in the 1960s and 1970s in most countries, giving rise to some fundamental debates about 
medical and social ethics. Its economic impact on the rest of the economy it was however almost nil.    11 
3. All these can change if the new sector is a capital good, which is used as intermediate input in other 
sectors.  For  this  kind  of  radical  innovations,  the  first  steps  of  interindustry  diffusion  consists  in 
influencing some few sectors connected with the parental sector. It starts, in  other words,  a quite 
common process in technology: the cross fertilisation of ‘old’ industries with the direct introduction of 
new means of production.10 The row of the new sector starts to be filled with some inputs given to other 
sectors. The latter will change inevitably their technical coefficients. As long as these sectors are also 
connected with the rest of the economy, a rolling ball starts to take off.  
4. To understand where (and when) the rolling ball stops, the best proxy is the analysis of the direct 
inputs that the new sector gives to the rest of the economy. We know, from input output analysis, that a 
basic sector is a sector which produces a good that is directly or indirectly necessary for the production 
of all other goods. In practice to be classified as a basic sector (or a basic good), it will be sufficient for a 
new sector (call it A) to affect a technical coefficient of just another sector (call it B). If B is  sufficiently 
connected to the rest of the economy, it will turn A (and for the matter, any sector that gives an input to 
B) into a basic sector. Yet, being a basic sector is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for building a 
new technological system and far less a new technological revolution. Though the basic sectors regulate 
the equilibrium properties of the rest of the economy, the impact of some of them could be limited, both 
in terms of the size of the sector, and of the degree of structural changes induced in the rest of the 
economy. 
5. A different story is when the new sector starts to affect directly the other sectors. It is the extension of 
these new inputs, and hence the density of the row of the new sector, that will determine if the new 
radical innovation will become either a technological system (affecting a cluster of sectors) or a new 
technological revolution (a general purpose technology, as it also been called that affects directly almost 
the whole economic system). This direct impact on the rest of the sectors is just a start for a wave of 
other incremental innovations that pervades the matrix. In some cases the wave of innovations are of 
such dimension and importance to generate new sectors, so that the Heraclitus matrix unfolds in its full 
extent.  
6. Obviously qualitative changes as the ones involved in a technological revolution bring with them a 
complete  reshaping  of  the  economic  environment:  sectoral  production  changes,  employment  moves 
across sectors, sectoral productivities levels are altered, relative prices transformed. The emergence of  
new markets, new opportunities of investment and new (and better) goods induces profound changes 
also of the demand side, and not just of the supply side.  
                                                    
10 An immediate implication of this process is that a “mature” sector could become, with the new inputs, very 
innovative.   12 
5.  Two additions: the final (consumption) demand and the role of labour 
The previous analysis in defining a Heraclitus matrix – as we call it – seems to have undermined two 
crucial dimensions. On the one hand, the role of final demand, and hence of consumer goods, which 
constitute usually more than two thirds of final demand. On the other hand, the role of the labour 
employed. In fact we could formally take account of both these two dimensions by adding an additional 
column (final demand) and an additional row (labour inputs).  
An analysis of final demand, allow us to re consider in particular the role of consumer goods that so far 
we have left at stage 2 of the previous Section, assigning them a secondary position. Such a statement 
could be disputed. At the end of the day, “the final aim of all production is consumption” (Adam Smith 
1776). Though the consumption sector collects the benefits of any technological innovation, it does not 
hold the characteristics of generating a technological revolution. It, so to speak, stays at the surface, 
without  entering  at  the  heart,  of  an  economic  system.  And  this  is  why  it  misses  to  produce  the 
devastating effects described in steps 3 6 of Section 4.  
However, some consumer sectors are able to constitute the centre of a new technological system, when a 
new sector constantly increases its production to satisfy an even higher potential demand. The increased 
production, in fact, is able to compact suppliers around the productive needs of the consumer sector. 
And  a  high demand  is  also  an incentive  for  further  incremental  innovations,  as  Schmookler  (1966) 
showed with its “demand pull” theory of technological change. This was the case for textiles at the 
beginning  of  the  First  Industrial  Revolution,  the  mass consumption  of  automobile  and  household 
appliances during the middle of this century, and the leisure industry (cinema, television) after the second 
World War.  
Another vector (a row vector) is also essential to complete the picture of our framework: the vector of 
labour. Human labour embodies knowledge. Above all, it embodies new knowledge through the human 
process of learning. This acquisition of new knowledge is preliminary in providing the basis of any 
innovation at the shop floor.  
A new sector in a Heraclitus matrix therefore should display its labour coefficient, that are (initially at 
least) quite high, since a new technology, precisely because it is new, lacks specialized capital goods. In 
particular the new sector utterly needs the kind of labour which embodies the emergent technological 
knowledge. This kind of labour, with its own skills and competencies, will be necessary also to any sector 
that is going to adopt (not just produce) the new technology.  
To put it sharply, only the diffusion of human learning across sectors, and hence only through the 
presence of a qualified labour force that is able to manage the new technology, a radical innovation could 
aspire  to  generate  a  Heraclitus  matrix  in  its  full  extent.  Without  the  spread  of  new  skills  and 
competences, throughout the economy, even the most promising radical innovation would abort its take 
off. The evolving structure of competences and skills will be therefore another (complementary) way to   13 
capture the pervasiveness of a new technology across the economy.  
6.  Is Heraclitus matrix essential for economic growth? 
The question of how much growth should be attributed to technical change is an old quest in economics 
(Solow 1957, Denison, 1967, 1983). In this paragraph, I shall not follow the same approach that is 
traditionally adopted, and which is known in the literature as “growth accounting”. This kind of exercise 
has not been exempt from criticisms both at theoretical level (it assumes a well “behaved” production 
function) and at empirical level (some required estimates are little more than “guess work”).11 I shall 
however ask the same type of question, though geared to better fit the title of this paper. Namely, are 
radical innovations necessary for long term economic growth? And consequently, is the emergence of a 
Heraclitus matrix a precondition to the raise of per capita income? 
The following table sets the symbols adopted in organizing an answer. 
TABLE 2. List of symbols 
Symbol    Macroeconomic and institutional variables 
Y ; PC Y   =  GDP; and per capita GDP 
P   =  Population 
A P   =  Active Population 
LF   =  Labour force 
P
LF
= m   =  rate of gross labour participation  
E   =  Employment (in units) 




= n   =  Number of hours per employee 
LF
E
= q   =  Rate of employment 
q - =1 u   =  Rate of unemployment 
                                                    
11 C. Freeman (1988, 9) writes on this point: “The various 'growth accounting' exercises, even after allowing for an 
entire Kamasutra of variables, generally remain with a big unexplained 'residual' (e.g.  1982) and fail to deal with the 




  =  Total labour productivity, i.e. ∑Yi / ∑Lhi 
    Sectoral variables 
i Y   =  Value added in the sector, i 
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l =   =  Share of labour force in sector, i 
i p   =  Labour productivity of  sector i 
    Sub  & super scripts 
t  =  time 
i  =  productive sector 
m  =  number of sectors at time t 
n  =  number of sectors at time t+1 
j=n-m  =  new sector 
 
Thus the subscript, i, affixed below the symbol refers to an individual sector of activity. The same 
variable (or other variables) without the subscript, i, refers to the economy as a whole.  
Synthetically, per capita income of an economic system, with many sectors, each of which characterized 
by  a  different  technology  and  a  presumably  different  productivity,  can  be  decomposed  to  a  set  of 
immediate factors and to another set of mediate factors, as follows: 
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a)  The first coefficient of equation (1), m , concerns the share of labour force in the country, which we 
can be called “gross” rate of participation. It is made up by two ratios: the first is the active to total 
population ratio, which is the result of demographic forces  and of other institutional decisions on 
retirement and schooling age. The second rate is the “proper” labour participation ratio, which is 
dependent  mainly  (but  not  exclusively,  see  Okun’s  law  implication  (Wachter  et  al.  1977))  on 
individual decisions and on social conventions.   15 
b)  The other two ratios (q , n ) are connected to the labour actually employed. The coefficient, q , 
expresses the rate of employment, defined (traditionally, since the definition has in recent decades 
changed) as the share employees in the total labour force. The coefficient, n ,  is the yearly number 
of working hours per employee, which is affected by  the legislation on working time (holidays, 
maximum working hours per week) and by other social and natural factors (strikes, environment 
conditions, etc.). The index is also crucially affected by the structure of the employees, for instance 
in their composition between full time versus part time workers.   
Historically, these indexes have moved (and are moving) in different directions. Among the developed 
world, the ratio of active population is lower nowadays than it was in the past. The rate of participation 
has decreased until sometime ago, but now in many advanced countries, it is turning up again. The rate 
of employment follows, more or less synchronously, the business cycle of each economy. The number of 
yearly hours per employee has been slowly, but systematically, lowered overtime, with few exceptions.  
It is sufficient this fragmentary information to envisage that the raise of per capita income experienced 
by the advanced countries, since the First industrial revolution, cannot be explained by a systematic raise 
of the above ratios.  
But the quest of whether the above coefficients are or are not responsible for the long run economic 
growth could be settled even without empirical evidence. All three coefficients, we have examined, are 
upper bounded –they cannot increase indefinitely. The first two (m ,q ) are ratios constrained to be 
lower than or equal to 1. The third coefficient (n ) is bounded (at the upper extreme) to the amount of 
hours that are available in a year. Hence, no one of them can move exponentially upwards. 
There are further motives even to deny that these ratios could progress synchronously towards their 
upper limit. As we see from equation (2), each ratio has at the denominator the variable that it is usually 
at the nominator in the previous ratio. So when there is the tendency of one ratio to, let us say, move up 
there is the simultaneous tendency for the other to  move down, if no counter  measures intervene. 
Sometimes these interdependences are exploited by policy makers. The more macroscopic case is the 
relation  between  the  working  hours  per  employee  n   and  the  rate  of  employment  (the  rate  of 
unemployment,  u , in fact). Higher rates of unemployment have induced policy makers to lower the 
working hours per employee, in the attempt to bring the rate of employment up again. A constant 
decrease  of  active  population,  aged  15 64,  has  called  for  policies  in  the  attempt  to  increase  the 
participation rate, so as a higher share of active population (mainly females) that were working free of 
charge outside the market, or  tax free in the black market, were induced (through incentives of different 
nature or tighter laws) of being part of the “official” labour market, and hence of the “official” labour 
force.  
In any case, whatever the actual trends, these institutional considerations weaken further the hypotheses 
that the above ratios may count as the cause of the modern economic growth. Historically, if nothing 
else, they have contributed to lessen it.    16 
The factors behind the output per working hours are therefore essential to explain the long growth of 
per capital income. The last ratio of formula (1) in fact refers precisely to the immediate factor of labour 
productivity.  
c)  Labour  productivity,  p ,  is  a  variable  that  is  dependent  of  the  level  of  technology  that,  in  a 
multisectoral economic system, is diversified from sector to sector. More specifically, it will be a 
weighted average of the sectoral labour productivities that makes up the economy. Formally: 
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(3) 
Being interested in its rate of change, and keeping in mind that a new sector, j, could appear in the new 
period, we could write the rate of change of labour productivity, by adding also the new sector that from 
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   (4) 
Being the terms in the square bracket the addition from the new  sector.  
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   (5) 
This decomposes the rate of change of labour productivity in two meaningful components: 
a)  One related to the labour force movements, weighted by the difference between the shares of Value 
added and the shares of labour force. 
b)  The  other  related  to  the  dynamics  of  labour  productivity  within  each  sector,  weighted  for  the 
importance of the sector in terms of labour employed.  
Moreover, if we accept that an industrial economy is constrained mainly by demand side, the first (and 
third addendum) can be further decomposed and equation (5) consequentially re organized, by recalling 
that  ) ( i
D
i i y p h l × = . By applying logs and derivatives and substituting the rate of change of labour 
shares, we will obtain, after some simplifications, the following meaningful formulae.   17 
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   (6) 
To explain, therefore, to what extent we may experience a long run growth of labour productivity, we 
shall inquiry on the movements of three sets of factors.  
The first factor is the dynamic of per capita demand on each sector. It may produce positive or negative 
effects on average productivity according to the sectors in which it occurs. If a positive change of 
demand occurs in a sector with a share of value added higher than its share of labour (which is a way to 
say that such a sector in the economy has an above average level of productivity) the contribution will be 
positive. Otherwise it will be negative, or nil in the special case in which a sector shows precisely the 
same productivity of the economy.  
The movements of demand therefore will induce (through the movements of the labour force across 
sectors) mixed effects on productivity. To be positive a raise of demand  concentrated on the high value 
added sectors is necessary. We may call this component of labour productivity, the Keynesian component of 
labour productivity, since  it is  demand driven.  
The second factor is the internal movement of labour productivities within each sector. This is mainly 
due to technological improvements, which can be fostered unevenly across sectors by many factors, 
following the different opportunities and level of maturity of the technology in use. A given positive 
change of sectoral productivity will produce always a positive impact on the overall productivity. But this 
impact of the rate of change of labour productivity could be higher or lower than the impact of other 
sectors, once weighted by their share of income  (measured in terms of value  added) in the economy.  
Therefore, as long as we have technical progress within one or more sectors, we will have a raise of 
labour productivity in the whole economy. Certainly, the raise could be of big or small dimensions, but 
the contribution is however positive. We may call this component the Schumpeterian component of labour 
productivity, for being strictly linked on the rate of innovativeness experienced by each  productive 
sector.  
The third factor is the expansion of the number of sectors, from m to n, due to the emergence of new 
capital  goods  or  new  final goods.  This  expansion  affects  both  the  Keynesian  component  (the  new 
demand induces the labour force to move on the new sector, j,  where the level of productivity may be 
different)  and  the  Schumpeterian  component    (the  new  sector,  j,   may  change  its  productivity at  a 
different rate, as compared to the rest of the economy). We may call this latter component the Heraclitus 
component of economic growth. 
To experience a persistent growth of per capita income we must detect therefore if one or more than 
one of these three components can move indefinitely upwards.     18 
The Keynesian component can certainly contribute to the growth  of labour productivity as long as the 
movement of the sectoral labour force is made towards those sectors with higher value added. To make 
it possible, one needs favourable circumstances with a particular evolution of demand. Namely a change 
of demand concentrated only, or mainly, in those sectors with a level of per capita valued added above 
average. In all other cases the Keynesian component will lower the overall labour productivity.  
To push forward the argument, let us suppose that the above favourable condition takes place. Can a 
positive contribution continue indefinitely? The answer is obviously negative. Even in a very hypothetical 
case of this kind, the Keynesian component cannot be a long run source of productivity improvements 
in  the  economy.  A  stop  will  happen  when  all  demand  (and  hence  all  labour  force)  would  be  (by 
hypothesis) concentrated in one single sector – the sector with the highest value added in the economy. 
In this case the average value added of the economy, will coincide with the value added of the sector 
itself, bringing the Keynesian component to zero.  
The Schumpeterian component, internal to each sector, is a simple weighted average of the rates of 
change  of  sectoral  productivities.  As  long  as  the  productivity  within  each  sector  grows,  the 
Schumpeterian component will contribute positively to the growth of the overall labour productivity and 
hence of the per capita income. Any growth of sectoral productivity will affect the growth of the total 
labour productivity, in proportion to the weight assumed in the economy by each sector, as measured by 
the relative shares of value added.  
Is it possible, we may ask, that changes of labour productivity within each sector (or within just a number 
of them, or at least one of them) can be indefinitely positive? Assuming this, it would be like to assume 
that in each sector incremental innovations can always be introduced, without experiencing a process of 
petering  out,  i.e.  without  ever  approaching  a  level  of  technological  maturity.  Only  a  continuous 
technological change within each sector will be conducive with a persistent positive contribution of the 
Schumpeterian component to labour productivity.  
This  possibility,  however,  seems  somewhat  questionable.  As  many  other  human  phenomena  also 
technological change is subject to a sort of logistic pattern. It grows relatively fast in the first phases of a 
newborn technology, it keeps a steady growth in the middle age of development, but at some point the 
impact on the economic system inevitably start losing momentum, by envisaging a phase of rest.12  
A  Parmenides  matrix,  with  even  incremental  innovations,  i.e.  with  an  even  change  of  its  technical 
coefficients, will eventually lose this feature, if no radical innovations are allowed. It is the emergence of 
the latter that may promote “gales of innovations” (in Schumpeter words) through time so as to keep 
                                                    
12 The analogy that has been made (see Dosi, 1982) between technological paradigms and scientific paradigms that 
at some point do not produce new knowledge is not casual, and has been widely acknowledged.   19 
positive the Schumpeterian component in the long run. Otherwise also this component will approach at 
some point a position of rest.   
The third component refers to the role of the new sectors, and hence refers properly to the Heraclitus 
matrix. The existence of new sectors plays a crucial role in sustaining the long run of per capita income 
for at least three reasons.  
First, as long as the new sector shows a level of productivity higher than the average economy, this new 
sector will contribute with a positive sign to the Keynesian component of productivity growth. If the 
new sector is “scientific based”, in the taxonomy of Pavitt (1984), the occurrence is very likely, since  
“high tech” sectors hold usually a higher value added per worker, as compared the rest of the economy.  
However, if by any chance this does not occur,  the Keynesian component in the new sector will affect  
negatively the total labour productivity.  
Second, the new sector will certainly produce a positive effect on the Schumpeterian component, since it 
is an innovative sector by definition (otherwise it would not have appeared in our matrix, in the first 
place). Moreover, we have already argued that according to overwhelming evidence, a new sector, with a 
radical innovation at its heart, should experience substantial improvements, hence raising the rate of 
change of its own labour productivity through time.  
Moreover, if the new sector produces capital goods so to affect the rest of the economy,  also the 
Schumpeterian component of the other “old” sectors, from 1 to m,  will start to be affected positively. 
New  capital  goods  have,  at  least  in  the  medium  long  run,  beneficial  effects  on  productivity 
improvements  in  the  sectors  in  which  they  are  used.  They  are  also  a  source  of  further    waves  of 
incremental innovations throughout the economy. These spillover effects will burst the Schumpeterian 
component of the rest of the economy too, with an evident impact on the overall labour productivity.  
 
Third, even supposing that the new sector does not contribute positively to the overall productivity with 
the lack of both the Keynesian component (a case possible), and the Schumpeterian component (a case 
very  improbable),  there  exist  a  further  important  channel  through  which  the  Heraclitus  matrix  can 
promote the long run economic growth. This is through the channel of the growth of demand, when the 
demand side constitutes a constrained for the economy. Let us see the logical argument. Equation 1, can 








mnp ,  which  shows  that  an  increment  of  the  average 
productivity  will  not  bring  any  positive  effect  on  per  capita  income  if    it  is  not  kept  up  with  a 
contemporary raise of demand. The reason is simple. Without increases of demand, any productivity 
improvement will result in higher unemployment (technological unemployment). Therefore, productivity 
will increase, but the employment rate,  q , will drop: the movement of one variable will cancel the 
movement of the other out, with an overall nil effect    20 
A radical innovation allows the emergence of new markets and new goods, which in turn relax the 
demand side constrain. In this context, consumer goods play a crucial role indeed. Once accepted that 
the demand of the traditional (“old”) goods may at some point reach a threshold level,   the so called, 
saturation level – only the emergence of new goods will be able to remove the feebleness of demand. In 
presence of unemployment, a raise of demand is a direct raise (see equation 1) of per capita income.  
Hence, only this third component (the Heraclitus component)  can promote the growth of per capita 
income in the long run. It can  bring productivity up, it can generate new demand, and it can cure 
unemployment, each of which factor is beneficial to the long run economic growth.   
7.  Evidence from data: the electronic revolution 
7.1. VI   The raise of a Heraclitus matrix 
In modern science, evidence is the Supreme Court of theory. The rest of the paper is devoted to gather 
some pieces of it around the concepts proposed so far. More specifically, our attention will be addressed 
to testing whether the technological changes, initially, in microelectronics, and then in information and 
communication technology (ICT) could or could not be considered “something new under the sun” as 
defined in the previous sections.  
I shall use data from the two Anglo Saxon countries: the UK and the US – two economies that more 
than others have been exposed to the this new technology. I am considering the decades from the late 
1960s to 1990s, in which electronic technologies started to make their timid appearance and then to 
spread throughout in the economic system. Its consequences in terms of pure economic performance 
will use (in Section 8) more recent figures.  
Data have been collected from difference sources made available from SPRU and Cambridge University, 
during a postgraduate stay. If not differently indicated, elaborations are our own. The attempt, as it will 
be clear, is not that of crunching data in econometric models to estimate particular coefficients. To 
engage in such exercises it would require a quality of data that unfortunately is not there.13 Instead of 
asking econometric questions, that the data may not able to answer, I shall try to organize at best the 
statistical information that can be retrieved from what it is available, without much numerical “tortures”. 
[around here Figure 3] 
                                                    
13 Input output tables, made up by statistical offices, have not a high reputation of reliability. To built these tables, 
in an advanced society with thousand of productive branches, requires a high quantity of resources, and highly 
detailed recordings. Both the former (resources) and the latter (detailed recordings) are admittedly less than optimal, 
so  that  for  many  branches input output  data  are just  a  rough  evaluation  of  reality instead  of  being  a  trusted 
representation of it.   21 
Figure 3 refers to input output data of the UK, for the year 1968. It represents the new born technology, 
electronics, in terms of inputs given to the other productive sectors of the UK economy. At that time, 
the input output tables recorded 90 productive branches. They are represented numerically in the x axes, 
with a short explanation of their subdivision by broad categories. Indicatively, the first part of the scale 
includes the primary sector, the central part of the scale includes the secondary sector and the final part 
of the scale the tertiary (or service) sector. Electronics production line, at that time, was not recorded as 
an independent sector. It was incorporated with telecommunication in the “productive branch 43”. So 
our empirical analysis in terms of direct inputs given to the rest of the economy of the row “electronics” 
will appear over estimated for being recorded with another sector. 
In any case this is what Figure 3 has to say. The analysis of the distribution of the direct inputs shows 
that  the  vast  majority  of  the  economy  remains  unaffected  by  the  presence  of  electronics  & 
telecommunication equipment. The only noticeable input is that given to their own sector, and to other 
three  sectors:  namely  “instrumental  engineering”,  “aerospace  equipment”,  and  to  lower  degree  to  a 
bunch of other sectors in the secondary sector (electrical machinery, other electrical goods) and in the 
tertiary sector, in particular “all other services”.  
We may conclude that the influence of electronics in the late 1960, was negligible in re shaping the 
structure of the UK economy. It was a radical innovation (the transistor was discovered in the late 1940s) 
that just made its appearance in the official statistics. The inspection of its column, shows that it is 
heavily  dependent  from  the  inputs  of  particular  branches,  like  “other  mechanical  engineering”  and 
“electrical engineering” (the two parental sectors from where it born). The inspection of its row in the 
input output tables is, instead, almost empty, as we have seen.  
[around here Figure 4] 
Figure 4 illustrates how the situation is evolved 16 years later, in 1984, when the next input output tables 
were made available. The new tables doe not contain the same sectors. Some of them have been re 
classified, others emerged anew, and only few of them disappeared from the statistical information. The 
“entries” outnumber the “exits”, so the total number of sectors are now extended to 101. The expansion 
of the new recorded productive branches involved particularly the tertiary sector. The re classification 
involved also the branch “electronics & telecommunication”, which is by now split up in two. Figure 4 
records the inputs given to the economy of the branch “electronic components”. 
From  the  number  and  size  of  bars  it  is  evident  that  the  electronic  inputs  start  to  pervade  the 
manufacturing industry. In the attempt to clarify the main sectors involved, the Figure picks, with an 
explicit label, those branches which show in their production process a relevant presence of inputs from 
“electronics components”. It is worth noticing two patterns.  
First,  electronics  seems  to  increasingly  integrate,  in  terms  of  inputs,  to  some  key  sectors  of 
manufacturing –  most notably, office equipment (computers), and telecommunication equipment.    22 
Second, electronics exerts some influence, as an intermediate good, also in the service sector, particularly 
affecting the branch of Telecommunication and finance.  This latter influence is easily detectable if we 
count the inputs that the integrated cluster of  computers and telecommunication equipment gives to the 
tertiary sector (panel b of Figure 4). In this case there is an evident increase of influence both in terms of 
the higher number of branches affected, and in terms of the magnitude of its inputs.  
[around here Figure 5] 
Figure 5 presents the same situation for year 1990. As compared to the previous statistical scenario, we 
notice at least three distinctive features. 
First, the sectors did continue to increase, and still these increases involve the tertiary sector. We have 
now 30 branches to record “Distribution and services” – twenty two years earlier the branches were just 
two.  
Second,  taken  alone  the  branch  of  “electronic  components”  affects  even  more  consistently  the 
manufacturing  sector,  in  particular  the  kind  of  manufactures  labelled  as  “light”  manufactures.  The 
pervasiveness of the technology affects directly, though not with the same intensity, many more sectors. 
If we observe the service section of the input output tables (on the right of the Figure), we may notice a 
minor quantitative impact, but a substantial widespread effect.   
Third, if we aggregate in a single cluster “electronics”, “telecommunication equipment” and “computers” 
and inquiry how their integrated row affects the rest of the input output table, the influence towards 
services is  even  more  noticeable  (see  Figure  5b).  Almost  the  entire  tertiary  sector  receives  a  heavy 
quantity of inputs from this cluster of electronic branches. There is almost no sector that on the right 
side of the input output table has been left untouched.  
This pervasiveness of the technology in affecting not only manufacturing, or industry,  but also directly 
the  service  sector,  it  is  a  feature  in  line  with  what  we  call  a  technological  revolution.  Electronics 
transformed the old tertiary sectors and contributed in creating new sectors across the economy. This 
seems a feasible representation of a dramatic technological change, in the sense that electronics and 
related sectors, have modified the matrix of inputs and hence the technical coefficients throughout the 
economy. It has promoted the creation of new sectors, and has contributed to the re generation of 
others, expanding the matrix, in particular towards tertiarization.  If by chance the semi conductor sector 
will stop working, there would be very few sectors– if any    that could keep their process of production 
activated.  
This is what we mean for a revolution: the structure of the economy is changed, and the nature of wealth 
is changed too. To be a great economic power nowadays a country needs to crunch chips, digital devices, 
and software, as it was necessary to crunch carbon,  iron, steel in the first two industrial revolutions.   23 
7.2.  Electronics knowledge and the labour vector  
Following our framework, it would be interesting to detect also the movements across the economy of 
that labour force with electronic competences.   
Information  on  the  composition  of  the  labour  force,  according  to  the  skills  and  competences  it 
possesses, is available in a much higher detail for the US economy than for the UK economy. I shall 
therefore present data from the former country. The proxy adopted to capture the cognitive abilities is 
the number of engineers according to their university field of specialization.  
The underlying argument is that the raise and the subsequent impact of electronics on the rest of the 
economy  should  be  detectable  by  a  different  composition  of  knowledge  in  the  labour  force.  The 
following Figures shall highlight this composition, first across the economy, and then within specific 
branches. The period examined mirrors only partially what has been done in Section 7.1 by examining 
the crucial period between 1980 to the beginning of 1990s.  
[around here Figure 6] 
Figure 6 presents the absolute numbers of engineers in the economy and their composition by field of 
specialization. They have been grouped in two broad categories for simplicity, so to allow a comparison 
between the two main technological paradigms of the past century. A first group of mechanical and 
industrial engineers, and a  second group of Electronic and Computer engineers. The total number of 
engineers in the economy has constantly increased over the whole period. In this growing overall trend, 
we may detect however the changing structure of knowledge base towards the new technology.  
The  message  conveyed  by  the  Figure  is  self explanatory.  In  the  1980  the  mechanical and industrial 
paradigm was already no longer dominant, but the proportion, between the two fields of knowledge, was 
comparable (24% vs. 33%). However in the following decade emerges an evident divide between the two 
shares. At the end of the period (1992)  electronics and computer engineers counted by almost half of 
the whole engineers in the labour force, leaving  mechanical and industrial engineers behind of more 
than 25 percentage points (42% vs. 16%). 
[around here Figure 7] 
Figure  7  allows  detecting  these  relative  movements  within  the  two  main  sectors  of  the  economy: 
manufacturing and services.  By making equal to 1 the initial levels, we note clearly how the economy 
absorbed an increasing number of electronic and computer engineers and how the relative level of 
mechanical and industrial engineers remained relatively constant through time. Therefore, the increasing 
number of engineers in industry  – we have seen in the previous Figure –  was due almost exclusively by 
the  field of  technical knowledge we are examining. This pattern involves both the manufacturing sector 
as well as the service sector with a striking similitude of behaviour, in line with the findings already made 
in the input output analysis.   
[around here Figure 8]   24 
Figure 8 inquiries more in detail whether the overall pattern that has emerged at aggregate level and with 
a basic disaggregation (industry vs. service) holds also at more detailed level. Six different productive 
branches are presented separately: the first three belong to manufacturing, the last three to services.  The 
main reason we have grouped them together is that they convey the idea of a uniform trend. Namely, in 
all sectors, during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the number of engineers in electronics and 
computer science went up well above the number of the mechanical and industrial engineers (and from 
what  can  tell  the  data,    the  rest  of  engineers).  There  is  no  exception  to  this  pattern.  Even  in  the 
machinery sector the trend is confirmed, let alone the other productive branches.  
[around here Figure 9] 
Figure 9 inquires more specifically what actually happens within the machinery sector, in terms of the 
relative presence of engineers with different specialization. In this productive branch it is plausible that 
the dominant paradigm in terms of competences of the labour force employed would be mechanics. This 
was clearly the case in 1980, when the majority of engineers, employed in the sector, were precisely 
mechanical and industrial engineers. Yet, in 1992 the picture is reversed –almost 50 per cent of engineers 
held a degree in electronics or computer science, while the first group of engineers dropped  almost 20 
points behind. 
To sum up, according to these figures, the composition of competences of the labour force across the 
sectors  show  a  widespread  infiltration  of  engineers  with  electronic  and  computer  degrees,  with  no 
relevant exceptions. This even occurs within the machinery sector, which should have been the kingdom 
of mechanics. Yet, it is no longer so. The electronic competences dominate also at mechanics’ homeland. 
8.  The economic consequences on the nature of the service sector 
A last point worth enquiring refers on the economic consequences of a changing nature of a sector.  
A point, which clearly emerges from the previous two Sections, is the crucial role of electronics in 
shaping the service sector. What are the implications of all this? The service sector has been considered 
always  a  sort  of  rag bag  where  those  goods  that  are  not  commodities  are  collected  all  together.14 
Throwing light on its composition, would reveal the presence of a vary different mix:  high value added 
sectors, but with low productivity growth (the professionals services), low value added sectors with low 
productivity growth (cleaning services, and alike), as well as the opposite (advanced tertiary sector).  
For  long  time,  the  prevalent  synthesis  that  emerged  from  statistical  offices, and  from  the  common 
perception  too,  is  that  services  was  a  sector  with  the  lowest  change  of  labour  productivity  in  the 
economy. Hence, tertiarization was seen as a threat in the promotion of economic growth. The argument 
was developed with the support of several theoretical models. Baumol’s disease model (Baumol and 
                                                    
14 The branch “services” are called by many statistical offices simply as “other sectors”.   25 
Bowen 1965) predicts, for instance, the raising of relative prices of the tertiary sector due to this lack of 
productivity growth. As Baumol once recalled, it is striking that with all the progress around us, it still 
takes four musicians to play a string quartet. Verdoorn’s law (1949 and 1980) argued that productivity 
growth was a by product of manufacturing output. Bringing the share of the latter down, and the service 
up, would inevitably slow down economic growth of any advanced economy (Kaldor 1966).  
The tertiarization process, according to these views, would at some point imply a stage of  ‘climacteric’ in 
a hypothetical life cycle of the economic system. This pessimistic foresight joints the crowded room of 
those who predicts a gloomy future.15 Yet, from the evidence of the previous sections, we should be 
concerned not with a sort of the ‘end of history’, but with the constant necessity to wash our eyes from 
the  dust  of  time  in  order  to  notice  the  emergence  of  novelties  and  offer  them  some  intellectual 
hospitality.   
The empirical case of electronics seems to suggest that there is indeed “something new under the sun” 
also in the service sector. What are then the consequences?  In the literature in the past decades there has 
been  different  quantitative  analysis in  the  attempt  to  capture  the  economic  effects  of  these  secular 
transformation.16  The prevalent outcomes of this research have been well summarized by the so called 
“Solow paradox”: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow 
1987, 36). In other words, what we called a technological revolution, seems it have not produced any 
significant effect on the growth of labour productivity and – according to the connection we made in 
Section 6 – on the growth of per capita income, at least as it is recorded by the statistical offices.  
The argument is somewhat hackneyed. Economic historians already put in doubt the significance (and 
sometimes also the existence) of the First industrial revolution on the ground that Britain, between the 
end  of  the  XVIII  century  and  the  beginning  XIX  century,  did  not  show  any  significant  economic 
growth.17  
In fact the industrial revolution did more. It changed, as a technological revolution is supposed to do,  
the nature of wealth. But also the quantity of wealth seems a point not to dismiss entirely. After all, 
Britain dominated the tables of per capita income in XIX century,  from 1820 to 1900, according to 
some estimates (Maddison 1995, 2001)18. 
                                                    
15 One of the most famous reports of this kind, which became very influential, was promoted by the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et al. 1974). In the occasion it was Chris Freeman and his colleagues at SPRU, who reminded that 
technical change will not go to disappear. 
16 See, among others, Griliches (1994). 
17 On this line of thought, see Clark (1986), Cameron (1985), Fores (1981), Coleman (1983). 
18 Great Britain comes first in the per capita income table in the benchmark years, 1820, 1850, 1900. In 1870, 
Australia takes the first place. It is not difficult to see that this latter leadership was due mainly to the great quantity   26 
Will the electronic revolution (or ICT revolution as it is better known) produce at some point, mutatis 
mutandis, the same quantitative effects?  
In  what  follows,  I  shall  attempt  to  analyze  the  role  played  by  Keynesian  and  the  Schumpeterian 
component of equation 6 for the US economy.  
[around here Figure 10] 
Figure 10 is the focus of the following considerations. It is divided in three panels. The first depicts the 
process of structural change of the US economy from 1965 to 2005, measured in terms of shares of 
value added in the three main sectors: agriculture, industry, services.  
The second panel compares in the same period the shares of value added and the shares of labour force 
of the service sector in the economy, by showing the evolution of these two variables in the same forty 
year period. It allows us to detect whether the Keynesian component of productivity growth in the 
service sector contributes positively or negatively to the overall performance.   
The lower panel shows the rate of change of labour productivity within the service sector, and compares 
it with the same variable for the whole economy. It gives indications of the contribution to the overall 
productivity rate of change,  played by the Schumpeterian component of  productivity growth in the 
service sector.  
From the three panels this is the information that can be gained from the data.   
i) 1965 75. The process of de industrialisation combined with the strong process of tertiarization is one 
of the various factors that help to explain why US growth has slowed down its process of growth.  
The second panel shows that the contribution to growth of the Keynesian component has been since 
(almost) the beginning of the period always negative, and consistently so thereafter. Therefore, the higher 
shares of labour concentrated in the service sectors accentuated the negative impact of this component 
in accounting to the overall economic performance.  
The third panel shows moreover that the rate of change of labour productivity in the service sector has 
remained  systematically  below  the  average  value  of  the  economy  too.  The  undergoing  process  of 
tertiarization, by giving weight to a less dynamic sector (as compared to those that were growing above 
the average), weakened further the process of economic growth of the economy. The Schumpeterian 
component of the service sector is therefore another factor that helps to explain the slow down of the 
US performance in the past decades.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
of natural resources (i.e. the old type of wealth) that Australia experienced at the time, as compared with the very 
small proportion of its population. Yet, the revisionists have still to explain the leadership of the UK, in the other 
three benchmark years, across the century.   27 
ii) 1995 2005. The tertiarization process seems to persist (upper panel), but its contribution to growth 
has somewhat changed (centre and lower panel). The central panel still shows a value added component 
which  is  lower  than  its  counterpart  shares  of  labour  force  in  the  service  sector.  Therefore  this 
component is still negative, though with a lesser degree. 
However, the lower panel indicates that the rate of change of labour productivity in the tertiary sector 
has started to increase consistently, bringing up  with it (given its weight in the economy), the rate of 
change of the overall labour productivity. Though the data for the service sector are highly controversial, 
it seems that tertiarization in the last decade is no longer a synonym of low productivity growth. Without 
the growth of productivity in the service sector, it would be hard to explain the exceptional performance 
of the US in the last decade or so.  
When about one hundred years ago, a  member  of the Royal Institute asked Faraday what was the 
practical impact of his innovation, he seemed to have answered: “What is the use of a newborn child?” 
As a child, also the electronic innovations – the novelty under the sun we have examined – took time to 
serve its  free lunch to the economic system. The childhood may have been long and the benefits still 
uncertain. But there is hope. After all, the tertiarization process does not necessary seem the beginning of 
the end of (economic) history. Solow’s paradox may be explained and solved. And the Baumol’s disease 
may be eventually cured. 
9.  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have tried to argue that, from an economic point of view,  an industrial world could not 
live without novelties. The old quest of whether there is something new under the sun or not has 
received both a logical answer (Section 6) and an empirical inquiry (Section 7 and 8). From our point of 
view, at least,  Heraclitus has something more to say than Parmenides in explaining  the modern process 
of economic growth.   
In a world that it is not ergodic, in which the future may not be qualitatively equal to the present, it is 
very difficult to say something that concludes an argument about novelties. However, an attempt will be 
made to see the implications of our results: 
• Technology is the main cause of structural change in the economy, this structural change relates not 
only  to  movements  in  production  or  occupation  of  given  sectors,  but  also  in  the  creation  of  new 
industries,  the  profound  transformation  of  others,  and  the  destruction,  or  obsolescence  of  other 
productive branches too. 
• Without this injection of new sectors, the modern economic growth will come to a halt. Schumpeter 
was  right  to  deserve  only  to  the  process  that  started  with  an  innovation  the  term  of  “economic 
development”. In fact we have shown that not all the innovations have the power to change profoundly   28 
the economic world. But some innovations do have this power. Are these innovations that keep, after 
more than two centuries since the First industrial revolution, the process of economic development alive. 
They  promote  –  through  what  we  called  the  Schumpeterian  component  –  an  increase  of  labour 
productivity, a burst of demand, while reshuffling the technology of the other sectors too.  
• Technological revolutions therefore exist. They are quite different from “political revolutions”, from 
which the term is borrowed. Political revolutions are usually instantaneous, the coupe d’état being the 
emblem that best represents it.  A technological revolution takes tremendously more time to make its 
mark. At the beginning it may appear insignificant and even costly for the society. In fact, any profound 
structural  change  pays  in  a  short  (and  sometimes  no so short)  run  a  cost  in  terms  of  economic 
performance. The technological revolution affects the rest of the economy – as we have seen – with new 
inputs. But new inputs initially bring technical coefficients up, not down as the typical conceptualization 
of technical progress, that economists had in mind,  presumes.  
•  If  technological  revolutions  exist,  several  concepts  in  economics  are  at  risk.  To  begin  with,  the 
proportional models, which still nowadays dominate economic growth. Second, the industrial theories 
and  policies  need  to  be  constantly  revised.  The  ‘life  cycle  theory’  may  misguide  both  analysis  and 
industrial policies, since what is an old sector today, could become a dynamic sector tomorrow – and 
vice versa. We have seen an example of this kind with the service sector. Third, the emphasis that 
economists deserve respectively to competition (neoclassics) and selection (evolutionists) should not 
overshadow the great importance of the industrial interdependences – and hence to the collaboration 
and the inter linkages issue between economic sectors. Forth, the long standing debate on the existence 
or not existence of long waves in economic history must not be dismissed from the modern economic 
agenda, as sometimes one has the impression it has been nowadays.  
So,  will  the  long  waves  continue  to  sustain  the  economies  and  offer  to  us  a sustainable  long  term 
economic development? This is a (the) big question, which it has intrigued the great economists.  To put 
it in our language, shall we have also tomorrow something new under the sun?  Schumpeter’s (1950: 118) 
answer does not leave doubts on the matter. “Technological possibilities are an uncharted sea, [and] 
there  is  no  reason  to  expect  slackening  of  the  rate  of  output  through  exhaustion  of  technological 
possibilities”. But probably the most encouraging answer to this big question, among all, came again 
from Keynes (1930: 326 28). In the middle of the Great depression, he wrote: “the economic problem 
may be solved, or at least within sight solution, within a hundred years. [...] Thus for the first time since 
his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem — how to use his freedom from 
pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won 
for him; to live wisely and agreeably and well”. This is an optimistic prophecy, which brings us back to 
philosophical  subject  matters.  As  a  prophecy,  it  has  not  been  fulfilled  yet,  but  it  is  still  helpful  in 
highlighting the vision of economics as a moral science that Keynes professed.    29 
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Figure 2. Stages of development through a technological revolutionInstrumental engineering
Distribution and Miscellaneous services
Energy supply and transport
Food, cloths and paper processing






Heavy and chemical sectors 11-30
Primary sector 0-10
Type of sectors in the economy  Number of sectors
Electronics and telecommunication







































Figure 3. Inputs given to the economy by the row of  ‘electronics and telecommunication’
1968 Input-Output Tables of the UK



















































Legend:  Electronic inputs (j) to the other sectors (i)  are normalized as follows: 
1968: aji is the share of input j in sector i: S aji = 1
1984, 1990: aji is the normalized share of input j in sector i (as above), times the ratio between b and c; where b is the share of 
value added of  sector j in the economy at time t, and c is the share of value added of  sector j in the economy in 1968 at 
constant prices.Figure 4. Inputs given to the economy by the row of ‘electronics components’
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Legend:  Electronic inputs (j) to the other sectors (i)  are normalized as follows: 
1968: aji is the share of input j in sector i: S aji = 1
1984, 1990: aji is the normalized share of input j in sector i (as above), times the ratio between b and c; where b is the share of 



















































)Figure 5. Inputs given to the economy by the row of ‘electronics components’
1990 Input-Output Tables of the UK
5b. Inputs to the economy by the rows ‘electronics+computers+telecommunication equipment’
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Legend:  Electronic inputs (j) to the other sectors (i)  are normalized as follows: 
1968: aji is the share of input j in sector i: S aji = 1
1984, 1990: aji is the normalized share of input j in sector i (as above), times the ratio between b and c; where b is the share of 



















































)Figure 6. Number of total engineers and shares of Electronic and Computer engineers vs. 



































































































































































Source: Elaborations from data of  National Science Foundation (1996).Figure 7. Number of Engineers of Electronics, Computers and Mechanics
in manufacturing and service sectors for the US
(index numbers, 1980=1)










Source: Elaborations from data of National Science Foundation (1996).Engineering Service
Figure 8. Number of Engineers of Electronics, Computers and Mechanics
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Source: Elaborations from data of World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006) and 
the  US Census of Bureau (2008) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007).
Figure 10. Structure of the US economy and contribution of the Service sector to the rate of 
growth of labour productivity
Negative Keynesian component
Below average 
Schumpeterian component